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Rochester, New York, located in upstate New York on
Lake Ontario has 250,000 residents living within the city and
approximately one million residents in the counties
surrounding the city. Rochester is best known for its
manufacturing, educational institutions and science/technology
industries.
The Rochester Riverside Convention Center is a 100,000
square foot flexible exhibit and meeting facility. The facility
offers a 50,000 square foot exhibit hall and 10,000 square foot
ballroom. Twenty two meeting rooms separated by movable
airwalls are available for meetings and food and beverage
functions. Exact dimensions, capacities and floor plans are
located in the chart in appendix A.
The objective of the center is to attract groups and
associations into the city to attend conventions, fill hotel rooms
and thus bring revenues into the local economy. It is
considered a loss leader, losing more money than it is able to
bring in through rental and services. Funding to support the
operational deficit is generated from two sources: the city
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hotel/motel tax and the city's taxpayers.
The shortfall of funds as of 1993 was approximately $1
million. This shortfall is measured against the annual economic
impact of visitors to the community, which amounted to $17
million.
Foodservice revenue as of 1993 fiscal year make up 70%
of the operating budget of the facility. This makes it the largest
revenue source. In 1985, prior to opening, foodservice was
contracted out to Ogden Allied Services, a major contract
feeder. In 1988, Joseph Floreano, the Executive Director, in
conjunction with the Mayor of Rochester, Thomas Ryan, made
the decision to take foodservice in-house.
This case study
examine'
s the decisional process of
transferring from contract to in-house foodservice. Also, five
years of financial statements will be evaluated as a means to
measure performance.
B. Background:
The trend in convention center management has been to
contract many of the service needs of the facility to outside
vendors. The largest revenue segment under a contract
agreement has been food and beverage services.
Contract organizations normally require a negotiated
percentage of gross revenues as a service fee to operate the
account. Contract organizations set quality specifications as
well as standard operating procedures on a national basis.
These procedures and specifications are set in order to satisfy
not only the convention center account but also the needs of
the contract organization. This dual goal can constrict
individual convention center flexibility, leading to lower food
and beverage revenues and profits.
Over the last decade some facilities have taken food and
beverage services in-house. Operating in-house services has
yielded a number of measurable benefits. With flexibility and
control, directors are able to set standards and procedures that
are customized to that particular facility, thereby increasing
the level of sales revenues. With increasing city and state
budgetary deficits, there is a continuous need to pursue
cost-
reducing activities as well as revenue enhancements. City and
state officials often lack foresight in the levels of funding and
support that convention center projects will require in the
future.
One can begin to reverse these obstacles with an
objective to continuously increase the revenue and profits of
food and beverage service. With food and beverage having the
potential to be the largest single revenue generating entity for
some centers, increasing food and beverage profits will
indirectly lessen the burden on taxpayers and subsequent
political pressure on convention center management team.
C. Purpose:
This study will examine the Rochester Riverside
Convention Center as an example of the decision process for
taking food and beverage services in-house. Exploration of the
financial track record for five years of independent operation
(FY1988-1993) will be included. It is believed that this will
identify the decisions convention centers have to make in
order to shift from contract to in-house foodservice.
D. The Problem Statement
Today, there is a lack of knowledge and experience in the
convention center industry to enable management to take over
food and beverage activities.
E. Assumptions
This study assumes that criteria can be generated to
determine feasibility of a convention center making the change
from contract to in-house.
This study assumes that unprofitable areas, or areas which
are beyond the ability of a convention center, may be
outsourced.
This study assumes that a convention center is in the financial
condition enabling it to fund a takeover.
This study assumes that there is a fully operational volume
foodservice kitchen on the premises.
Ideological Assumptions- By usage of accepted financial
measures of performance, personal bias influencing project
results is avoided.
F. Scope and Limitations:
This study examines the Rochester Riverside Convention
Center from FY1987 to FY1993 as it shifted from contract to in-
house foodservice. It is the intent of this study to provide a
working model based on the Rochester Riverside Convention
Center as a basis for other convention centers to ascertain
whether or not a similar shift would be feasible.
The study is limited both by the model (Rochester
Riverside Convention Center) and the variability of all other
convention centers. Since there are so many factors affecting
the viability of a convention center, most of which do not yield
to the influence of the center's management, there may be only
a few centers similar in size, scope, facilities, mission, etc.,
which would be able to use the model without significant
revision. Nevertheless, some may find the model appropriate
for adaptation.
G. Methodology
The primary methodology used was the case study.
The case study analyzed data from Rochester Convention
Center financial statements for the fiscal years 1987-1993.
Analysis of this data has taken the form of graphs comparing
financial performance to operating years. A Gantt chart shows
the time line of events leading to and through the process of
takeover. Anecdotal information from foodservice records and
research as well as interviews of Joseph Floreano (Executive
Director) and Paul Cramer (Assistant Executive Director), who
were instrumental in the transfer at the Rochester facility.
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With a focus on the key issue, extraneous investigations can be
eliminated, thus moving the project towards its purpose, which
is to offer a descriptive analysis for the decisions and processes
of moving a convention center's foodservice from contract to an
in-house operation.
H. Definition of Terms:
Contract Foodservice: Foodservice provided by an outside
operator returning a percentage of revenues or management
fee to the convention center for operations.
Economic Impact: Direct spending by visitors, delegates,
associations, and exhibitors to the community as well as direct
employment impact and tax impact.
Fiscal Year (FY): For budgetary purposes the Rochester
Convention Center year begins in July and runs through June.
In-house (Foodservice): Food and beverage services
established and operated by convention center management,
separate from services contracted to outside vendors. Also
known as "self-op".
Outsourcing: Entering into a contractual obligation with an
outside company to provide product and services within a
given convention center facility.
10
Chapter 2
Review Of The Literature
Over the past few years articles have been written examining the
issues surrounding the decision to outsource or operate foodservice
in-
house. In February 1994, Amusement Business Magazine reported that
the Thomas Mack Center in Las Vegas announced its decision to takeover
foodservice to an in-house managed operation. This decision was made
after ten years of operation under contract by Volume Services Inc.. Their
stated objective in taking over foodservice was the potential for increased
revenues/profitability, the ability to control labor, food pricing, and a
closer control on quality. In most cases management was not unhappy
with the use of contract service, however, they deemed the economic
potential to be greater being managed in-house. (Deckard, 1993)
The subject of foodservice takeover as reported by Deckard in
Amusement Business in February 1994, dominated a foodservice panel
discussion at the District IV and VIII sections of the International
Association of Auditorium Managers (IAAM) convention held in Salt Lake
City. The IAAM panel discussion centered around a debate regarding the
positive and negative points of contract versus in-house. The panel
included Bob Anderson, Thomas Mack Center, Las Vegas; Jeff Blosser,
Oregon Convention Center, Portland; Bob Stefanski, Ogden Entertainment
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Services; Judhi Chopping, Meydenbauer Convention Center, Bellevue,
Wash.; Scott Williams, Delta Center, Salt Lake City. Centers were included
that currently operate in-house as well as representation from contract
organizations.
Positive aspects as communicated by directors with in-house
foodservice were that with a lack of management fees the financial aspects
were very enticing to make the transfer. Additional flexibility of directors
to designate and monitor levels of quality and service were positive. Scott
Williams, Executive Director of the Delta Center in Salt Lake City, an in-
house concept, felt that facilities operators that have outsourced food and
beverage look at their profit and loss statements with management fees




Positive points for contracted foodservice were lower levels of risk
and day to day operational responsibilities. Bob Stefanski from Ogden
Entertainment, a contractor, said that contract companies bring value to
facilities in that they make large investments in equipment, leasehold
improvements and contract acquisition. In addition, they also bring
national account buying power and insurance coverage including high cost
coverages such as liquor liability and workers comp coverages. (Donoho,
1993)
Negative points regarding self-op were that self-op was viewed to be
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only as good as the local managers. There was a greater risk depending on
the available pool of qualified personnel. Risk of failure was great due to
risk and costs of a standalone operation.
Negative points regarding contracting were that contract vendors
tend to be very bottom line oriented. Profitability and quality are
sacrificed for higher earnings.
The overall feeling of managers on the panel who currently contract
out foodservice was that they were skeptical about whether or not to
initiate a self-op decision or a takeover process. Bob Anderson from the
Mack Center sees a necessary importance in that the concept of self-op
must be part of the company's mission. The panel clearly felt that it was
not in the best interest of all facilities to pursue the self-op concept. Many
facilities did not have the management experience or potential to make a
takeover successful. This article eluded to the fact that it takes a great
effort to run foodservicean effort some facility managers would like to
leave to someone else. (Deckard, 1993)
Judhi Chopping, executive director, of the Meydenbauer Convention
Center discussed their decision to go self-op with the September 1993
opening of the center. Management took proposals from many contract
organizations and weighed all the options. In their end analysis the
management fee on outsourcing projections would cost more than
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$100,000 to the bottom line. The financial ramifications motivated the
company's decision to self-op. Her feelings on the move to self-op were
that "Managers often feel inept at food service, and I had a little bit of
knowledge."
The financial results look good on paper, but the knowledge
and experience is vital to long term success. (Deckard, 1993)
William Just, executive vice president and cofounder of the
Association for Convention Marketing Executives, explains in an article in
Association Management that municipalities across the country are
tightening their belts and looking around for new revenues. Local
government is looking at budget cuts wherever possible and seeking to
raise tax dollars. Convention centers traditionally viewed as loss leaders to
attract free-spending conventioneers into the city's hotels and restaurants
are being urged to minimize their losses and come as close to breaking
even as possible. The concept of break-even is still relatively new in the
convention center business; few centers have ever made it to that point.
This article points to the fact that states build these facilities but
underestimate the long term need for funding. (Just, 1993)
If facilities are losing money, perhaps the prices they are charging
should be adjusted to make up some of the expenses. Rising costs of food
and beverage was the subject of an article in Convene Magazine. Citing a
feeling of astronomical markups on food and beverage, the author, Toni
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Grainer, posed the question "Where else but in a convention center can you
find a gallon of coffee costing $32.00 before tax and
gratuity?"
(Grainer,
1993). With tighter budgets and rising costs consumers become more and
more sensitive to the costs of planning meal functions for large groups.
This creates a dilemma for convention center management teams. If
expenses are too high, the market will not bear higher prices for the goods
and services offered.
Due to a slow economy in the hotel industry, hotels have become
more interested in contracting outside foodservice in the form of catering.
This may also include securing longer term contracts for catering the food
and beverage needs of public facilities. Hotels in many cases due to their
direct proximity vie for contracts to cater foodservices at convention
centers. In a March 1994 article in Agent and Manager, the author
discusses the competition between hotels and convention centers. Gary
Shaw, convention manager of the Bostrom Corporation feels that planners
rely on hotel chefs for varied menus and elaborate presentations. In
comparison, he feels that convention centers "try
hard"
but the staff is
unable to compete with the skill of a hotel banquet chef. He feels that
convention centers are capable of preparing hot dogs and hamburgers, but,
the rest should be left to more qualified operators. The quality of
foodservice offered at hotels is perceived to be higher in most cases to that
of convention centers. Some hotels look to use this perception to their
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benefit when bidding on convention center contracts. (Israel, 1994)
In an article on the advantages and disadvantages of contracting
school foodservices Stephen LeBruto and Behshid Farsad draw some
parallels to the subject being examined here. They feel the advantages of
a contract relationship are tighter control of costs, fewer costly benefits
packages, and application of systems and of current technology. They site
the fact that the self-op concept relies on the food service professional in
its employ for the development of methods and procedures. This
individual does not have the corporate back-up that contract companies
can offer an account. An important advantage of the contract relationship
is the lack of bearing the costly component of wages, salaries and benefits
which in recent times have become an even more burdening constraint in
a labor intensive industry. Food service companies are able to offer
employee training programs and continuing educational opportunities, a
luxury not always possible in a convention center facility.
(Lebruto/Farasad, 1993)
Disadvantages to employing the outside operator in a school
food-
service situation are a loss in personal relations with customers, staff, and
foodservice employees. Losses in operational control are inevitable, which
can lead to lower standards, improper equipment maintenance and
deterioration of community goodwill. Foodservice management companies
are "for
profit"
entities that will strive for bottom line profit objectives.
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This may involve frequent transfer of employees, which decreases the
opportunity for developing relationships. Standards can suffer as a result




Tabulation and Analysis of The Data
Data comparison in Figure 1 was examined by contrasting Food and
Beverage Net Income against the total revenue for the Rochester
Convention Center. On the following page is a line chart showing two years
of Ogden performance (FY'87-'88) and five years of in-house performance
(FY'89-'93). The years under Ogden produced an average net income of
nine percent. Within three years of in-house operation, the Center
experienced over 100% increase in net income as a percentage of total
revenue. This comprised 19% of total revenue in FY1993. In FY'91-'92
there was a correction due to local economic recession, corporate cutbacks








Figure l.--Food and Beverage Net Income as a Percentage of
Total Rochester Riverside Convention Center Revenue
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A review of food and beverage net income for FY'87-FY'88 (Ogden) as
compared to FY'89-FY'93 (RRCC In-House) is illustrated in Figure 2. This
chart shows increases in the annual contribution to overhead. In the two
years that Ogden contributed dollars to offset the deficit, net income
reached a high of $180,000 in FY'88. The In-house foodservice more than
doubled that in the first year of the takeover(FY'89). Fiscal year 1993
proved to be the highest level with a contribution of $800,000 to the
shortfall. These figures are significant given the deficit of $1 million. If
net income from food and beverage continues to rise, it could offset a



























1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
RRCC In-house
Fiscal Years
Figure 2. --Food and Beverage Net Income (Thousands)
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The Gantt chart (Figure 3) found on the next page outlines the start
and end points of the steps made to takeover the Rochester operation.
The process began in April of 1988 and commenced in September
1988. The significant points begin with the budgetary problems
experienced in April. The decision was made soon after that meeting
which set the process into motion. The short time frame was due to the
ending of the fiscal year on July 1, 1988. Managements goal was to
takeover operations on July 1. Ogdens last meal was served days prior to
the July 1 deadline.
The inhouse team began operating with its first event on July 4,
1988, the annual client appreciation party, which made for a smooth
transition introducing the new organization to the new staff.
Staffing, menu planning, policies, procedures and training were
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Figure 3. --Gantt Chart
July 1, 1988
Takeover
-?Date of start and. completion
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Steps for generic transfer process:
Listed in order of approximate importance, starting with highest.
Process should be completed in approximately nine months.
1. Complete feasibility study
2. Make decision
a. Company mission
b. Goals and Objectives
3. Secure funding source for buyout
a. Capital funding through city
b. Capital funds available in convention center reserves
c. State grants
4. Secure qualified Food and Beverage Director
a. National, Local search
5. Hire transfer consultant
a. Recognized in industry
b. Bring on board six months prior to transfer
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6. Establish staffing levels
a. Investigate historical revenues
b. Revenue potential
c. Local staff quality and availability
d. Hire staff
7. Estimate contract value
a. Inventory equipment
b. Goodwill
8. Create policies, procedures, and operational processes




e. Financial reports, controls and tracking
f. Budget set-up
9. Create marketing plan
a. Target market
25






Executive Director, Rochester Riverside Convention Center 4/27/94
10:00AM
Assistant Executive Director, Rochester Riverside Convention Center
4/27/94 8:00AM
The process for the takeover of foodservice at the Rochester
Riverside Convention Center began in 1983. Joseph Floreano had been
selected from a pool of 50 candidates by members of the Rochester
business community to operate the proposed downtown convention center.
He came to Rochester with a personal goal to run a facility that produced
its own foodservice.
In early meetings with the city's director of personnel Mr. Paul
Breyer, it became evident that opening the center with its own foodservice
would not be an easy process. The city would mandate that all employees
below management would have to be civil service employees, including the
chef, and other major operational positions. This was compounded by a
meeting with the city's
director of purchasing which outlined how
purchasing would be handled.
All purchases would be handled through
the city purchasing department.
The example at the time that was given
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was that if a client wanted chocolate cake and it was put out to bid and no
bids were returned then the client would be unable to have chocolate cake.
It became evident that the way the city envisioned the process to be
handled would not yield well to the hospitality industry. That left the
normal next step in convention center planing which was to seek bids from
outside operators.
To pursue an outside operator, a food and beverage committee was
formed to investigate contractors. Directors at the city as well as outside
hospitality business executives were summoned to the task of evaluating
incoming proposals and making a final decision.
A request for proposal was put out and was answered by Service
America, Ogden Allied Services, and a local organization, Sibley Catering.
Some interest was later expressed by Marriott Corporation as well.
Through a study of each company's service and quality, financial
status, and viewing of active accounts, a decision was made to have Ogden
Allied be the official provider of food and beverage services at the center.
A key determination in making this decision was the level of service that
the company could provide. Ogden Allied was selected based on the
feeling of the committee that Ogden would best serve the needs and
expectations of the Rochester market.
In February of 1985, a contract was entered into by the City of
Rochester and Ogden Allied Services. The strategy employed by
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Mr. Floreano was to keep the investment on the part of Ogden to a
minimum. All major capital purchasing was done by the city. Ogden was
responsible for mainly smallwares to keep their investment low. This
would enable an easier transfer at a later date. As well, a clause was
written into the contract giving the convention center the right to break
the contract at anytime to take services in-house.
By August of 1985, a separate not for profit corporation was set up
to oversee the running of the center. This helped the center to operate out
of direct control by the city. It is not common to have a separate board of
directors, many centers are a department of the city and must handle a
greater degree of bureaucracy in operating.
Ogden had a slow start after the opening in August 1985. This was
due to their lack of making advanced sales. Information had been
forwarded to their corporate offices, but management, sales, and
employees were not onsite until weeks beforehand. Media coverage for
the grand opening was plentiful and positive. Great expectations on the
part of the community were evident during this time.
Soon after the opening, quality problems began to plague events at
the center. Quality of food was the main area of concern. In the first year
it was explained away as the newness of the facility and that problems had
to be ironed out of the new operation. It became evident that Ogden was
not investing in qualified or experienced people. It was further recognized
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that the contractor was going to maintain their revenue potential/
profitability at a high cost to the operation.
This realization was difficult to understand on the part of convention
center management and board of directors. It had been discussed in the
contract negotiation that the level of quality and service was to be high. In
an attempt to ensure this higher level, a 10% rather than a normal 25%
commission back to the city was negotiated into the contact.
Unfortunately, the reputation continued to fall. Letters and phone
calls to the Mayor's office from unhappy clients of the center were
constant. The tracking of groups using the center showed groups that had
not returned because of poor quality. A meeting was set by Mayor Ryan to
address the problem with Mr. Floreano and Mitch Savage from Ogden
Corporate regarding the falling levels of quality. Ogden responded by
making some management changes. The changes proved to be a short
term solution the the initial quality problems.
In March of 1988, Mr. Floreano met with the Mayor and the city's
budget director to discuss the next fiscal budget. It was at this time that
the Mayor explained that the city was experiencing increasing budgetary
difficulties. The subsidy to the center was increasing and revenues were
staying flat. The commissions
on food and beverage were coming in below
projections. At this meeting Mr. Floreano
recommended the takeover of
food and beverage. Mayor Ryan supported the decision and asked Mr.
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Floreano to proceed.
That afternoon, the Mayor's office contacted Mr. Floreano to prepare
a council item to secure the funding for the buyout. At this point, word
had not been given to Ogden about the change. Unfortunately, the press
picked up on the council item and called Ogden Corporate for a response.
This put the process in a delicate situation for a while.
The next immediate step was for Mr. Floreano to bring in a Food and
Beverage Director to oversee the transfer process which was slated for
July 1, 1988. He called upon Paul Cramer who had worked with Ogden
Allied as a banquet manager at the Rochester Center. Mr. Cramer arrived
in May 1988. Mr. Cramer began the process of organizing the systems to
takeover operations.
Mr. Cramer began the process of takeover by completing a self-
evaluation of the operation. Through this process he developed a mission
statement and business philosophy. The high end market segment was
targeted as not to compete with the local party houses who were
concerned over possible losses of business. Budgetary numbers were set
up, staffing levels for the new operation were put in place and a menu was
developed.
The next area was to establish a system of controls and policies.
These areas were broken down into bar, banquet, kitchen, concessions, and
sales. Goals and objectives were put into place for these areas to facilitate
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tracking of success.
Organization and hiring of the majority of the staff was completed in
the month prior to takeover. Items to be taken by Ogden were
inventoried, the value of those items left had a depreciated value placed
on them. The buyout was completed successfully on July 1, 1988. The




Summary, Recommendations, and Conclusions
Summary:
Through this investigation it became clear that quite a high degree of
risk was assumed in pursuing this takeover. The decision for a takeover of
foodservice is one of risk versus possible financial gain. In the Rochester
case study city budgetary reasons as well as quality concerns, motivated
the organization to implement a takeover.
Recommendations:
When examining contract versus in-house foodservice an
organization must examine long term strategy and mission. The current
mission of a convention center to bring convention business into the city
could hamper efforts to reach a breakeven point. It is really not possible
to achieve both objectives. Revenue is normally constrained by a "no
compete"
policy for local business. In order to maximize revenue potential
for food and beverage the "no
compete"
policy should be lifted. This would
be a highly controversial political decision on the part of city officials due
pressures from local community business leaders.
Future recommendations for other operators seeking to transfer food
and beverage services would be to complete a feasibility study of the
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operation prior to making the decision. Through this feasibility study,
problem areas or areas of unprofitability could be discovered. It is quite
possible through takeover to put together in-house operations with
outsourced services to create an optimum package.
One of the most challenging areas for directors is managing the
amount of risk that is involved in taking foodservice in-house. This risk
takes the form of increased liability, and bearing a higher degree of costs
of a stand alone operation. Risk also takes the form of a danger of
management losing control by the sudden addition of complete
responsibility and accountability for foodservice operations.
There needs to be an acceptance of change in daily operations. As in
the Rochester example, the target market segment and the level of quality
were changed. A successful transition should include staff training and
development. Staff should be educated regarding the new market and the
change in expectations. An adequate transition period can avoid staff
falling into past practices.
Flexibility, contingencies and a greater understanding of personnel is
an area of great importance. For example, if the chef disappears, there is
no corporate back-up. This puts a great degree of pressure on the human
resources aspect. Existing personnel then bear the burden of the overload.
In an in-house concept your marketing plan relies heavily on your most
recent function; there is no national ad campaign endorsing your business.
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A failure in one event could result in lost profits.
It is further recommended that a consultant be secured through the
pre-opening organization and setup of the new operation due to the
normally short time lines where assistance on a short term basis is
required. The expertise of a consultant in the industry would be
invaluable to those operators who possess limited knowledge or experience
in foodservice operations.
Conclusion:
The result of observation of the Rochester Convention Center points
to a successful takeover of foodservice operations. The need for an
increasing subsidy was avoided due to increases in revenue after the
takeover. This study concentrated on the financial aspects of the decision
to transfer.
Further study is needed to establish benchmarks for quality and
service in this industry. That type of information would require a study
establishing primary information which could be used by other convention
centers. In the Rochester example, poor quality was cited as an important
impetus for the transfer. The poor quality perception measured through
lost business and negative correspondence was turned around by the in-
house operation. Positive letters of praise increased and repeat business
returned to the facility.
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From this examination it can be concluded that the Rochester
Convention Center is a pioneer that took the risks in a fairly uncharted
area of foodservice takeover. Other facilities may not want to take as big a
risk but steps as outlined above can be taken to reduce that risk.
The financial impact of a successful foodservice operation can be the
difference between an increasing need for subsidy and a means of which
to effectively manage operational costs and long term viability. Given the
increasingly wide degree of fiscal responsibility, convention centers need
to look at every feasible source for revenue enhancement and cost
reduction. Moving from a contract foodservice to in-house is one such
means for revenue enhancement.
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